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The politics of austerity have deepened market penetration across the UK policing sector, 
bringing into effect an array of new policing assemblages which cut across the public-
private divide like never before and defy simple categorisation.  However, public discourse 
has not kept pace with this fast-changing reality, all too often reducing these assemblages 
into an amorphous singularity ‒ ╅privatisation╆ ‒ towards which one is either 
unambiguously for or against.  This article accordingly sets out the analytical tools for 
developing a more nuanced discourse on the privatisation of policing.  It first develops a 
new typology of privatisation across five categories: function, formulation of private 
sphere, trigger of privatisation, regulatory influence of the state and relationship to the 
ideal-type police monopoly.  It then operationalises this typology using four recent 
examples of privatisation drawn from the UK policing sector.  It lastly clarifies how this 
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The fiscal crisis experienced by many western capitalist states during the 1970s is 
regarded as a key factor behind the privatisation of policing in the late twentieth 
century (Spitzer and Scull, 1977; Shearing and Stenning, 1981; Jones and Newburn, 
1998).  Economic stagnation, rising unemployment and an overburdened public 
exchequer caused many governments to impose constraints upon police force budgets 
at a time of deepening socioeconomic inequality and escalating crime rates, creating an 
unmet demand for protection among their citizenries.  Over time, this demand was in 
part satisfied through the market, bringing into effect a range of new policing 
assemblages which spanned the public and private sectors in previously unseen ways.1  
Right now, this sequence of events has a pronounced air of familiarity about it.  This is 
because we are in many respects living through a period of history repeating.  Following 
the 2008 collapse of the global financial system, a second fiscal crisis hit many of the 
same western capitalist states, with familiar consequences for the economy, the public 
exchequer, police budgets and the privatisation of policing (Millie and Bullock, 2013).  
The cumulative effect of these crises is that scholars, practitioners, policy-makers and 
other interested parties looking upon the policing landscape today are confronted with 
a complex set of assemblages which cut across the public and private sectors like never 
before and defy simple categorisation.   
 In the United Kingdom (UK), however, public discourse has not kept pace with 
this fast-changing reality.  When discussed in public fora, these assemblages and the 
                                                     
1 When used as a noun ‒ as it is here ‒ the term ╅assemblage╆ denotes any kind of socio-spatial 
configuration (Anderson and MacFarlane 2011).  In recent years this term has been picked up by policing 
scholars to describe the multitude of new institutional arrangements materializing across the policing 
landscape precisely because of its non-specific nature (for example, see: Abrahamsen and Williams 2011).  
The advantage of this generic nomenclature is that, unlike many other terms in the traditional policing vocabulary┸ it does not automatically conjure up an association with the ╅police╆┸ thereby creating a more evenly balanced analytical space in which to explore the ╅private╆ and its relationship to the ╅public╆┻ 
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processes which lie behind them are all too often reduced into a kind of amorphous 
singularity ‒ ╅privatisation╆ ‒ towards which one is either unambiguously for or against.  This unhelpful reductionism has been fuelled by a particularly ╅hot╆ political climate 
(Loader and Sparks, 2010) where signature events, such the failure of G4S to fulfil the 
conditions of its £284 million London Olympics security contract, have served as 
flashpoints around which latent scepticism regarding market penetration into the 
policing sector has been unleashed in vociferous terms (White, 2015a, 2016).  In this 
climate, high profile and impassioned critiques (Prescott, 2012) and defences (Green, 
2012) concerning the privatisation of policing have been plentiful, whereas nuanced 
empirical debate on its numerous and varied forms has for the most part been 
conspicuously absent.  As public discourse on privatisation has become, if anything, 
even more polarized following the recent demise of outsourcing behemoth Carillion, 
which at the time of its collapse in January 2018 had no less than £1.7 billion worth of 
government contracts on its books, there seems to be little prospect of this climate ╅cooling down╆ any time soon┻    
  Against this backdrop, the purpose of the article is to contribute towards the 
development of a more nuanced discourse on the privatisation of policing.  It goes about 
this task in three parts.  It first advances a new typology of privatisation across five 
categories: function (steering and/or rowing); formulation of private sector (market 
economy and/or community); trigger of privatisation (policy led and/or demand led); 
regulatory influence of the state (institutional and/or cultural); and relationship to the 
ideal-type state monopoly (strong, medium or weak).  It then operationalises this 
typology by applying it to four recent examples of privatisation drawn from the UK 
policing sector: the Lincolnshire Police ‒ G4S Strategic Partnership; the attempted 
crowdfunding of additional police officers by residents in Hampstead, London; the 
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procurement of ex-police officers by residents in Belgravia, London; and the purchase of 
private security patrols by residents in Frinton, Essex (see Figure 1).  It lastly suggests 
how this typology can be used to inform public discourse on the privatisation of 
policing.   
  
Figure 1: Typology of Privatisation 
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Typology 
To begin with, it is important to clarify precisely what is meant by ╅policing╆ and ╅privatisation╆┻  While in the popular imagination ╅policing╆ is simply taken to mean ╅what the police do╆ ‒ a definition born of the monopolistic ideals which continue to 
impress upon the collective consciousness in many liberal democracies (Reiner 2010) ‒ 
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policing scholars have sought to move away from this interpretation over recent 
decades.  Recognising the increasing number of actors directly engaged in policing 
activities yet not formally part of the police institution, they have instead gravitated 
towards a more pluralistic interpretation which encompasses, in the words of Jones and 
Newburn (1998: 18), all: 
 
those organised forms of order maintenance, peacekeeping, rule or other 
enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of 
investigation and associated information-brokering ‒ which may involve a 
conscious exercise of coercive power ‒ undertaken by individuals or 
organisations, where such activities are viewed by them and/or others as a 
central or key defining part of their purpose. 
 
Put simply, the scholarly norm is thus now to regard the police as just one of many 
actors ‒ public or private ‒ charged with carrying out policing functions. 
 While the privatisation of policing is undoubtedly one of the principal factors 
behind the growing acceptance of this more pluralistic interpretation, the term ╅privatisation╆ is actually deployed in remarkably different ways throughout policing 
scholarship.  Its various articulations can usefully be situated on a spectrum bookended 
by ╅most exacting╆ definitions on one side and ╅least exacting╆ definitions at the other.2  
When used in its most exacting form, privatisation generally refers to the transfer of 
defined parts of the police workforce and/or estate to the market economy.  The 
paradigmatic examples here are those localised and empirically detailed case studies 
                                                     
2 The ╅most exacting╆【╆least exacting╆ distinction is borrowed from (ay╆s ゅにどどぱょ reflections on how the equally slippery term ╅globalisation╆ is defined┻ 
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which focus on the outsourcing of specific service areas ‒ such as custody suites, control 
rooms or training facilities ‒ from a specific police force to a specific contractor (see: 
Skinns et al, 2017).  When used in its least exacting form, privatisation usually relates to 
any kind of broad shift from the public sphere towards the private sphere across the 
policing landscape.  The classic examples here are those historical overviews which 
illustrate how the constitution of this landscape has gone through a gradual but decisive 
reorientation from the state towards the market economy over the past forty or so 
years (see: Shearing and Stenning 2016).  Both articulations ‒ together with all the 
various permutations which lie in between ‒ are perfectly justifiable so long as an 
accompanying rationale is put forward.   
The aim of the present typology is to work with the grain of the least exacting 
public discourse on the privatisation of policing while, at the same time, imbuing this 
discourse with a something of a more exacting edge.  In what follows, then, a kind of ╅in between╆ definition is deployed.  That is, the least exacting definition serves as a broad 
canvas upon which a series of more exacting definitions are stitched together.  In 
pursuing this enterprise, it is important to briefly acknowledge some of the work 
already undertaken towards this (or similar) end(s).  In two prominent examples, 
Johnston (1992, pp.183-203) and Jones and Newburn (1998, pp.199-246) advance a 
range of useful categories through which to conceptualise the privatisation of policing ‒ 
the sectoral, spatial, structural, legal, functional and geographical (see also: Button 
2002, pp.5-19).   They arrive at these typologies by integrating the theoretical literature 
on the public/private divide with a series of empirical observations on specific policing 
assemblages.  This approach ‒ that is, the iterative relationship between theory and 
empirics ‒ is significant.  It illustrates how there is no definitive way of conceptualising 
the privatisation of policing in practice because all attempts to do so are to some extent 
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a product of the empirical context in which they are formulated.  With this point in 
mind, the remainder of the section advances five categories through which to 
conceptualise the privatisation of policing.  While some of these categories overlap with 
the aforementioned typologies, they have ultimately been selected not for reasons of 
intrinsic scholarly value but because of their immediate relevance to the four policing 
assemblages under examination.  
 The first category is the function in question.  There are a variety of ways to 
define the function(s) of policing: the broad ends towards which any given policing 
assemblage is directed (e.g. order maintenance or profit maximisation); the narrow 
ends towards which any given policing assemblage is directed (e.g. making arrests or 
protecting clients); the means used by any given policing assemblage in realising these 
ends (e.g. the exercise of force or the enactment property rights); or some combination 
of the above.  The focus here, however, is on organisational function.   When discussing 
the transfer of organisational functions from the public sphere to the private sphere it 
has become common practice for policing scholars to make a distinction between, on 
one side, the process of directing and financing policing goods from above and, on the 
other side, the process of delivering these goods on the ground.  This distinction is often 
conceptualised using either Bayley and Shearing╆s ゅにどどなょ ╅auspice╆【╆provider╆ pairing 
(see Berg 2015) or Osborne and Gaebler╆s ゅなひひにょ ╅steering╆【╆rowing╆ metaphor (see 
Crawford, 2006).  The present discussion adopts the latter terminology for the simple 
reason that it is more widely known.  For now, then, it is sufficient to acknowledge that 
sometimes both steering and rowing processes are shifted from the public sphere 
towards the private sphere, whereas at other times they are to some extent decoupled 
and only one makes this journey, leaving the other behind.   
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 The second category relates to different formulations of the private sphere.  
Given what is at stake in conceptualising the private sphere ‒ nothing less than the 
realm of autonomy defined in relation to the authority of the state ‒ different 
formulations abound.  That said, two formulations have cemented themselves above all others in policing scholarship┺ the private sphere as ╅market economy╆ ゅthe voluntary exchange of goods between buyers and sellersょ and the private sphere as ╅community╆ 
(the grouping together of individuals in relation to a specific location and/or set of 
values).  While these formulations are often linked together when discussing the ╅pluralisation of policing╆ ゅCrawford┸ にどなぬ┹ Jones and Lister┸ 2015), this is less common when discussing the ╅privatisation of policing╆┸ where the focus tends to be on the 
market economy to the exclusion of community (though see Johnston 1992).    This is 
problematic, however, because while the transfer of policing functions to the market 
economy is undoubtedly the central focus of public discourse in this policy area ‒ and is 
accordingly the main concern of this discussion ‒ in reality this dynamic is often bound 
up with a concomitant transfer of policing functions towards the community.  To 
exclude the community from the outset is thus to unnecessarily cut off an important 
dimension of the privatisation process.  As a consequence, both formulations are 
included in the present typology ‒ that is, privatisation may engender a movement from 
the public sphere towards the market economy and/or the community.   
 The third category relates to different triggers of privatisation.  While the full 
range of possible triggers is essentially limitless, Starr (1988: 15) usefully narrows down the field by distinguishing between two broad points of origin┺ ╅policy led╆ privatisation triggered by government strategy┹ and ╅demand led╆ privatisation 
triggered when demand for a good outstrips public supply and a private alternative is 
sought out.  Importantly, both points of origin find resonance in contemporary policing 
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scholarship.  Not only have scholars investigated the extent to which governments 
consume, work alongside and create the conditions for others to engage with an array 
of policing actors across the private sphere (Garland, 1996; Goold et al, 2010).  But they 
have also explored why individuals, communities and businesses seek out and develop 
policing initiatives within this sphere, with some of the primary motivators being the 
rising levels of insecurity and risk sensitivity (Zedner, 2003; Abrahamsen and Williams, 
2011), the expansion of corporate networks across nation-state borders (Spitzer and 
Scull 1977) and the emergence of mass private property (Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 
1983).  In the present typology, both triggers assume a central role, either together or 
independent of one another.   
The fourth category concerns the ongoing regulatory influence of the state.  
One of the central themes running through the extensive scholarship on the regulatory 
state is that during the course of the privatisation process, the state is rarely (if ever) 
removed from the equation entirely.  Broadly speaking, the ongoing influence of the 
state can be either ╅institutional╆ ゅstatutory regulatory tools designed to control the delivery of privatised goodsょ or ╅cultural╆ ゅa form of symbolic capital realised within the 
course of regulatory engagements) (Black 2002).  Given the historic importance of the 
state in the policing sector, it is unsurprising to discover that both kinds of influence 
find articulation in contemporary policing scholarship.  While some scholars map out 
and evaluate the numerous institutional regulatory regimes through which states 
control policing initiatives in the private sphere (de Ward, 1999; Button and Stiernstedt, 
2016), others focus on the various strategies by which public and private actors seek to 
realise the symbolic capital of the state so as to enhance their standing within the 
policing sector (White, 2010, 2012; Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011; Thumala et al, 
2011).  Against this backdrop, the present typology recognises that the privatization of 
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policing is frequently accompanied by various institutional safeguards (from 
regulations to contractual stipulations) and/or cultural signifiers (such as uniforms and 
badges) designed to retain the material and/or ideational presence of the state.   
The fifth and final category reflects back on the preceding four categories to 
assess the overall degree of privatisation.  It does so by measuring ‒ in least exacting 
terms ‒ any given initiative╆s relationship to the ideal-type state monopoly.  Within 
the context of the present typology, this ideal-type can be viewed as an arrangement in 
which both steering and rowing functions are firmly rooted in the public sphere.  This 
ideal-type is important not just because of its historical importance as a blueprint for 
the police institution, but also because it has over time cemented itself in popular 
consciousness ‒ what Reiner ゅにどなど┺ ぬょ terms ╅police fetishism╆┻  This means that 
whenever a new privatization initiative roams into view, it is almost inevitably judged 
in part by its relationship to this ideal-type (White, 2015a).  With this in mind the 
typology accordingly sees any given policing initiative as having either a ╅strong╆┸ ╅medium╆ or ╅weak╆ relationship to the ideal-type policy monopoly.  This is by no means 
an exact science, but it does at least indicate in broad historical terms the overall degree 
of privatization involved. 
 
Case Studies 
Over recent decades, the UK policing sector has played host to countless initiatives 
linking the public and private spheres together in new and innovative ways.  In the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis, however, this process has experienced a pronounced 
acceleration.  In an effort to repair the beleaguered public exchequer following the state 
bailout of the banking sector, the Coalition Government enforced a 20 percent reduction 
on the Home Office police budget between 2010 and 2015.  These constraints in turn 
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precipitated a new wave of policing experiments, many of which entailed some kind of 
transfer from the public sphere to the private sphere.  In this section, four of the 
resulting policing assemblages are weaved through the above typology so as to 
demonstrate its utility in bringing about a more nuanced discourse on the privatization 
of policing.  The main criterion for selecting these assemblages is their prominence 
within the local and national media ‒ all of them hit the headlines because they brought 
something new and interesting (and indeed jarring) into the UK policing sector.  This 
notoriety is important because it not only means there is ample data on these examples 
readily available, but it also helps to connect the ensuing discussion with recent public 
discourse on the privatisation of policing. 
Lincolnshire Police Ȃ G4S.  While the aforementioned reduction in the Home 
Office police budget presented severe funding challenges to all police forces, the 
predicament faced by Lincolnshire Police was particularly acute.  It already had the 
lowest annual expenditure and lowest total workforce number per head of population 
across all forces and therefore had comparatively few opportunities to make savings through workforce reduction and internal restructuring programmes ゅ(er Majesty╆s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary 2013: 36 and 153).  As such, the Lincolnshire Police 
Command Group and Police Authority took the decision to realise a significant 
proportion of the requisite savings by outsourcing a range of service areas to the 
private sphere.  Soon afterwards, the force initiated a fast paced and highly competitive 
tendering process, eventually signing a £229 million contract with G4S commencing in 
April 2012.  The contract transfers the delivery of 18 service areas ‒ including frontline 
operations across the control room, custody suites and police station front counters ‒ 
from Lincolnshire Police to G4S over ten years.  It is anticipated that the deal will save 
Lincolnshire Police £36 million over this period and will give G4S a profit margin of 
13 
 
6.2% per year (White, 2014, 2015a).   This example of privatisation made the headlines 
for a number of reasons.  At first, because it represents by some distance the most 
extreme case of police outsourcing in the UK and has therefore been regarded as 
historically significant (Johnson, 2011).  More latterly, because five members of G4S 
staff working in the control room were suspended after making hundreds of ひひひ ╅test calls╆ in order to artificially inflate performance measures ゅTravis┸ にどなはょ ‒ a cynical 
sleight of hand which serves only to obfuscate slow response times to genuine 999 
emergencies. 
 What are the main characteristics of this case?  For the most part, only rowing 
processes ‒ such as dealing with 999 emergency calls, booking detainees into custody 
suites and addressing queries at police station front counters ‒ have been privatised.  
While G4S does have some strategic buy in, the most important steering processes ‒ 
such as drawing up key performance indicators and managing the contract ‒ have 
remained firmly in the hands of Lincolnshire Police.  Also, these rowing processes have 
been transferred from the public sphere to the market economy not the community.  In 
a clear instance of voluntary exchange of goods between buyers and sellers, 
Lincolnshire Police announced its intention to outsource a range of service areas to the 
market and, following an open competition between 12 interested parties, chose G4S ‒ one of the world╆s largest multinational corporations ‒ as the preferred supplier.  
Furthermore, this whole process represents an unambiguous case of policy led 
privatisation, with the Command Group and Police Authority consciously initiating the 
entire enterprise having examined alternative ways forward.  Importantly, even though 
the contract represents the most radical example of police outsourcing in the UK, the 
ongoing institutional and cultural influence of the public sphere remains considerable in 
(at least) three respects: Lincolnshire Police has a Commercial Partnership Team which 
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manages every aspect of the contract on a day to day basis; the majority of G4S staff are 
actually former Lincolnshire Police staff who transferred between institutions through 
TUPE regulations on day one of the contract, bringing with them a wealth of public 
sector experience (though this number is diminishing through employment churn);3 
and the ongoing symbolic presence of the police in the outsourced service areas is palpable┸ with Lincolnshire Police╆s logo appearing alongside GねS╆s on all epaulets┸ 
lanyards, email signatures, letterheads and so on.  As such, it is possible to reason that 
the Lincolnshire Police ‒ G4S strategic partnership actually has a relatively strong 
relationship to the ideal-type state-centric conception of policing. 
Crowdfunding in Hampstead.  While the fundamental duty of the police is to 
serve all citizens equally regardless of wealth or status ‒ a mission underpinned by the 
core Enlightenment principle of equality before the law ‒ it is not uncommon for police 
forces to compete with their private sector counterparts in a quasi-market environment 
by charging payment for ╅additional╆ services.  Examples of what is commonly known as ╅user-pays╆ policing include┺ traffic controls┸ guards and escorts where the beneficiary is 
a private business; criminal history and probity checks; reports to insurers and 
solicitors; and provision of training (Ayling et al, 2009: 136).  In the UK, the most 
prominent examples of user-pays policing have come about through the Police Act 
1996, which allows for certain bodies to apply for additional police officers, so long as 
costs are met (see Crawford and Lister┸ にどどはょ┻  )n recent years┸ the Mayor╆s Office for Policing and Crime ゅMOPACょ has used this legislation to launch Met Patrol Plus┸ a ╅buy one get one free╆ scheme ‒ where the ╅one╆ is a police officer ‒ aimed at Local Authorities 
and Business Improvement Districts in London.  In November 2015, residents in 
                                                     
3 TUPE is the common abbreviation for the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
Regulations 2006, which protect the rights of employees when their employer changes through, for 
instance, the sale or outsourcing of physical assets. 
15 
 
Hampstead ‒ a wealthy North London suburb ‒ launched a crowdfunding initiative to 
put additional police officers on their streets through the scheme, following what they 
perceived to be a sharp increase in crime after their local police station fell casualty to 
the politics of austerity the previous year.   Within six weeks they had raised £180,000 
of their £600,000 target ‒ which would translate into six Constables and a Sergeant for 
three years ‒ and were drawing increasing media attention (Proto, 2015).  To begin 
with, media focus was on the sheer novelty of the applicant (a group of wealthy 
residents rather than a Local Authority or Business Improvement District) and their 
means of raising money (online crowdfunding) (Jefferies, 2015).  Soon afterwards, 
however, the lens shifted to the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who asserted that while he was ╅open minded╆ about crowdfunding as a means of injecting extra cash into the police┸ he was ╅intuitively against╆ any efforts by wealthy residents to capture a 
disproportionate share of this public good through quasi-market arrangements 
(Whitehead and Barrett, 2015).  At the time of writing, no application has yet 
materialised.     
 What are the key elements of this case?  To begin with, only certain steering 
processes ‒ how to pay for police resources and where to direct them ‒ are being 
privatised.  Not only are other important steering processes ‒ including the application╆s ultimate sign off ‒ staying within the grasp of MOPAC and the Metropolitan 
Police, but so too are all rowing processes given that additional patrols are to be 
undertaken exclusively by police officers.  Interestingly, these steering processes are 
being relocated from the public sphere to both the community and (to some extent) the 
market economy.  Not only are Hampstead residents mobilising as an organic 
community bound together through a strong identification with a particular 
geographical location, not for profit.  But they are using their collective purchasing 
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power in a quasi-market environment to buy in extra police officers rather than 
pursuing private sector alternatives.  Furthermore, this whole enterprise is being driven 
by a combination of policy led and demand led privatisation.  While MOPAC initiated the 
Met Patrol Plus scheme on the back of the Police Act 1996, it was the desire of 
Hampstead residents to see more police officers on their streets which diverted the 
policy down its present unforeseen trajectory.  Yet even though this scenario could be 
interpreted as a potential case of public resources being misappropriated by private 
interests ‒ as alluded to by the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police ‒ the influence 
of the public sphere would always be considerable.  The additional patrols would exist 
within the exact same public sector institutional architecture as every other police 
officer and would embody traditional police culture ‒ and, indeed, this is precisely what 
the Hampstead residents want in any case.  Against this backdrop, it is thus possible to 
contend that the Hampstead crowdfunding initiative also retains a relatively strong 
relationship to the ideal-type state-centric conception of policing.   
Ex-Police Patrols in Belgravia.  The ideal-type conception of policing articulated 
in liberal political thought may have contributed towards the modern nation-state 
building process from the 18th century onwards ‒ especially in Northern and Western 
Europe ‒ but it certainly never materialised into a true institutional reality.  Not only 
have police forces variously been used as repressive instruments of class, racial and/or 
religious rule throughout modern history (Spitzer, 1993) but, either way, the market for 
policing has never sufficiently disappeared from view to leave enough space for a state 
monopoly to properly take hold (see Johnston, 1992).  In the UK, where these liberal ideals are deeply rooted┸ even the supposed ╅golden age╆ of the police during the なひのどs 
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was marked by a small but growing market for policing (White, 2010: 41-59).4  Today, 
the UK industry has expanded into a state-regulated £6 billion plus sector which 
completely eclipses the police in terms of manpower (British Security Industry 
Association, 2015: 2).  This means that when in 2017 residents of Belgravia ‒ another 
wealthy London suburb ‒ were also looking for ways to redress a perceived security 
vacuum caused by the declining number of police patrols under the politics of austerity, 
they turned not to the Metropolitan Police (like residents in Hampstead) but to the 
closest thing the market had to offer ‒ the new company My Local Bobby.  For between 
£156 - £480 per month, this company supplies close protection and investigation 
services performed by experienced ex-police officers and┸ through its ╅pursue and prosecute╆ branch┸ has so far brought forward over ぬどど private criminal prosecutions 
with a 100 percent conviction rate.5  This initiative immediately drew the attention of 
journalists because of its stark public-private sector overlaps.  Not only are its 
employees highly experienced state-licensed ex-police officers outfitted in 1950s-style 
police tunics designed in consultation with the London School of Fashion, but to 
facilitate its private prosecutions it maintains an information-sharing agreement with 
the Acro Criminal Records Office (McCoy 2017).  
                                                     
4 Unfortunately, no institutions were systematically collecting data on the size and composition of this 
market in the immediate postwar years ‒ as the Security Industry Authority (SIA) does today ‒ so 
estimates are few and far between and vary considerably.  Randall and Hamilton (1972, p.67) suggest 
that total private security industry sales in the UK at this time amounted to approximately £5 million, 
indicating a relatively small market.  By contrast, Jones and Newburn (1999a, p.102) observe that in the なひのな census there were no less than ねは┸ひのど individuals working in the ╅Security occupations╆┸ indicating a 
much larger market.  However, it is important to note that not all of these individuals were employed in activities associated with the private security industry┻  )ndeed┸ the category of ╅Security occupations╆ 
included those working as tidesmen, signalmen, meteorological reporters, park rangers and coast guards, 
to name but a few (General Register Office 1956, p.111).  The exact size and composition of the market 
during this period thus remains something of a mystery.  It is incontrovertible, however, that the market 
has grown substantially since then.  As of April 2018, the SIA recorded 325,203 licensed individuals in the 
UK private security industry ‒ see: https://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/Pages/licensing-stats.aspx  
5 www.mylocalbobby.net/about-us/4593930224  
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 What are the salient features of this case?  In this instance, both steering and 
rowing processes have been privatised concurrently, but not to the same part of the 
private sphere.  On one side, steering processes such as strategic decisions relating to 
procurement and deployment have been transferred from the public sphere to the 
community ‒ once again a group of individuals bound together by a deep sense of 
geographical place.  On the other side, rowing processes such as the provision of close 
protection on the ground have been shifted from the public sphere into the market 
economy ‒ the residents have used their collective buying power in the competitive 
market to choose the service which suits them most, deciding upon My Local Bobby as 
their preferred supplier.  Moreover, given that all these decision-making processes 
flowed from a community dissatisfied with the public supply of policing, the entire 
initiative stands as an unmistakable example of demand led privatisation.  But while all 
these features suggest an instance of privatisation entirely rooted in the private sphere, 
the influence of the public sphere remains considerable.  In institutional terms, My Local 
Bobby personnel ‒ like all other personnel in the contract manned guarding sector ‒ are 
licensed by the Security Industry Authority (SIA), the public body tasked with 
regulating the private security industry in the UK.6  This means that, at minimum, they 
have gone through a state-administrated criminal records check and training 
programme (White┸ にどなのbょ┻  The company╆s information-sharing agreement with the 
Acro Criminal Records Office adds a further institutional connection to the public sector.  
In cultural terms, the distinctive employment history and appearance of the company╆s 
officers, both of which seek to recreate the ethos and symbolism of the golden age of the 
police, have the effect of imbuing the services it provides with a significant degree of ╅stateness╆ ‒ this indeed is the company╆s unique selling point┻  While these connections 
                                                     
6 www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk  
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with the public sphere are certainly not as embedded as those in the Lincolnshire and 
Hampstead cases, it can still be reasoned that the Belgravia case has something like a 
medium strength relationship to the ideal type state centric conception of policing. 
Private Patrols in Frinton.  The expansion of private policing into a multi-billion 
pound industry has prompted ongoing concerns about a range of negative externalities, 
chief among them being the entrenchment and exacerbation of socioeconomic 
inequalities (Wood and Shearing, 2007; Loader and White, 2017).  Put simply, this 
market gives wealthier individuals, communities and businesses access to better 
security measures (in terms of both quality and quantity) than poorer ones.  This 
inequality was acutely evident when residents of Frinton ‒ a small town on the Essex 
coastline ‒ were looking for ways to redress a perceived security vacuum caused by the 
recent closure of a local police station under the politics of austerity.  Like the residents 
of Belgravia they turned to the market economy, but unlike their wealthy London 
counterparts, they chose not to access the high end of the market, where companies like 
My Local Bobby offer a police-like service at a premium rate.  Instead, beginning in 
November 2015 approximately 300 residents each began paying just £2 per week to the 
company AGS to provide nightly street patrols between 19.00 and 07.00, together with 
an emergency response function (Khomami, 2015).  This initiative became headline 
news when just six months later the Frinton residents cancelled the contract following a 
series of allegations that the initiative was turning into a protection racket, with cold-callers ╅hammering on doors after dark and exaggerating crime rates╆ to drum up 
business (Levy, 2016).  In other words, it came to symbolise some of the dangers in 
buying services at the more cut-throat end of the market for policing. 
 What are the central dimensions of this case?  To begin with, the Frinton case of 
course shares many similarities with the Belgravia case: steering processes have been 
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transferred from the public sphere to the community; rowing processes have been 
shifted from the public sphere into the market economy; and decision-making processes 
arose from a community dissatisfied with the public supply of policing, making the 
initiative a further example of demand led privatisation.  When it comes to the ongoing 
influence of the public sphere, however, there is a contrast between the two cases.  
While there is still an institutional connection in the Frinton case given that AGS 
personnel ‒ like all other personnel in the contract manned guarding sector ‒ are 
licensed by the SIA, there appears to be less of a cultural connection.  Judging by the 
practices which catapulted it into the news cycle, AGS has not gone to the same lengths 
to reproduce the symbolism and professional ethos of the police╆s golden age.  As a 
consequence, it can be concluded that, unlike the Belgravia case, the Frinton case has 
only a relatively weak relationship to the ideal type state centric conception of policing. 
  
Conclusion 
The article has now illustrated how the typology can be utilised to make sense of the 
complex policing assemblages coming into effect under the politics of austerity.  It just 
remains, then, to clarify how this process might help scholars, practitioners, policy-
makers and other interested parties to enter into a more informed public discourse on 
the privatisation of policing.  To begin with, it provides a more nuanced conceptual 
vocabulary for describing and explaining the numerous and varied forms of 
privatisation.  In reference to the limited number of examples above, for instance, it 
illustrates how sometimes the privatisation of policing takes shape around a transfer of 
steering functions from the public sphere toward the private sphere (crowdfunding in 
Hampstead), sometimes rowing functions (Lincolnshire Police ‒ G4S) and other times 
both functions at once (ex-police in Belgravia and private patrols in Frinton).  In some 
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instances, it centres upon a shift from the public sphere towards the market economy 
(Lincolnshire Police ‒ G4S) and in other instances towards both the market economy 
and community (crowdfunding in Hampstead, ex-police in Belgravia and private patrols 
in Frinton).  On some occasions, the shift from the public sphere towards the private 
sphere is policy led (Lincolnshire Police ‒ G4S), on some occasions demand led (ex-
police in Belgravia and private patrols in Frinton) and on other occasions both at once 
(crowdfunding in Hampstead).  In some cases, the ongoing influence of the public 
sphere takes the form of institutional safeguards (private patrols in Frinton) and in 
other cases both institutional safeguards and cultural signifiers (Lincolnshire Police ‒ 
G4S, crowdfunding in Hampstead and ex-police in Belgravia).  Lastly, sometimes this 
combination of variables results in a relatively strong relationship with the ideal type 
state-centric conception of policing (Lincolnshire Police ‒ G4S and crowdfunding in 
Hampstead), sometimes a medium relationship (ex-police in Belgravia) and other times 
a relatively weak relationship (private patrols in Frinton).  What is more, these are only 
the combinations resulting from the four policing assemblages under examination.  The 
total number of possible combinations available through the typology is much greater, 
meaning it should have more to offer looking ahead as the policing landscape in the UK 
and beyond continues to undergo far reaching transformations of this nature.  
 However, the typology offers more than just a conceptual vocabulary for 
describing and explaining the privatisation of policing.  It also lays down the 
groundwork for the development of more refined value judgements.  It does so by 
illustrating the pitfalls in adopting a position either unambiguously for or against the 
privatisation of policing.  None of the examples above represent a clear and decisive 
transfer of policing functions from the public sphere towards the private sphere.  Rather 
they all represent a complex blend of public and private architectures, behaviours and 
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motivations.  As a consequence, ardent critics of the ideals which lie behind 
privatisation might actually find ‒ against their better judgement ‒ some ╅good╆ in this 
reality.  Similarly, fervent defenders of these same ideals might actually find ‒ likewise 
against their better judgement ‒ some ╅bad╆┻  In other words, the complex empirical 
trends brought into frame through the typology bump up against any such polarised 
normative positions.  This is not to suggest that observers should drop these normative positions┸ for they remain important yardsticks against which to judge the ╅good╆ and the ╅bad╆ in the privatisation of policing.  Nor does it point towards any kind of 
resolution in this policy area.  But it does hopefully signpost the way towards a better 
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